International Terrorism

The British Command had weeny use for the massive ground forces that would play a study part in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. In general, British strategy consisted of: victory with negligible risk and minimal losses; superior marine might; and avoidance of large-scale continental operations (Morton 87-88). Such strategies would be sorely tried and true in the war to come.

capital of capital of Singapore was centrally located at the crossroads of British Empire trade routes in the nineteenth century. During that time, Singapore prospered as a port providing work for Chinese, Indians Australians and British. As a Crown colony, Singapore's decidedly undemocratic government keep a modest role in imperial refutal (McIntyre 9).

Following World War One, the only rival navies were allies, the coupled States and lacquer. Without a base east of Malta, Britain found itself in the boorish position of matching the naval strength of its two major partners. For this reason, British focus shifted to Singapore and the distant Pacific marine (McIntyre 19-21).

First proposed in 1919, initial plans called for construction of a naval base in preparation for hypothetical wars with the U.S. at drop cloth Harbor and the Nipponese home bases (McIntyre 2). Singapore was chosen since, although the field of battle was too far for an easy attack on or by Japan, it could protect both the cri

If the defense of Singapore was of utmost importance to British strategy, American interests dictated a far different position. While Singapore was fundamental to maintaining Empire security, U.S. policy boiled down to a belief that, as important as the Island was in the far-off East, America was not alert to support Singapore at the expense of security in the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions.

With 44 ships and a troop strength of about 88,600 men on hand for the defense of Singapore, defender numbers looked better than those of Japanese aggressors - but that was on paper. In reality, 37,000 were ill-trained, ill-equipped Indians, while some other 16,800 were Malayanan "volunteers" (McIntyre 195).

Essentially, 60 percent of the Singapore defenses consisted of poorly prepared foreign soldiers and volunteers. The remaining 35,000 British and Australian troops would be facing an army of 60,000 highly-trained Japanese.

Stark believed that Germany was the primary adversary and that Japan could be dealt with in time (Watson 118). Thus the threat to American interest in the Pacific was of secondary importance. Foreseeing the loss of Singapore and unwilling to risk its warships in a hopeless cause, the maritime Chief wished that the U.S. fleet would be employed offensively to ingest Japanese strength away from Malaysia and thus support the Malay Barrier (Morton 150). Stark believed that it behooved the Americans to wait, as they gained strength, but not so long that the Britain fell. He did not relish the grim facet of the United States facing a victorious Axis attachment alone.

Vacillating and ineffective bureaucratic British policies under Chamberlain and Churchill abounded between the Wars. Requiring 20 years to complete, the construction on the Base was retard because the government had trouble bank-rolling the project. Budget cuts and work slow downs were de rigueur (McIntyre 57). Meanwhile, British Chiefs of Staff, caught in the crosscurrents of cha
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